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(NATIONAL) TRADEMARK LAWS AND
THE (NON-NATIONAL) DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE*
1. INTRODUCnION
This Symposium has explored several ways in which cyberspace
has challenged existing legal boundaries. Boundaries take many
forms. When we talk of boundaries in relation to cyberspace, we may
readily assume that the term has merely spatial significance. Spatial or
geographic boundaries are inevitably challenged by the Internet, which
(as yet)' knows no geographic limits. And thus the Internet intensifies
the clash of dueling legislative competencies that globalization more
generally has brought to the fore. These clashes occur not only
among different countries (horizontal clashes), but also among na-
tional, international, and supranational bodies (vertical clashes). To
what extent, and according to what principles, can national rules work
in a non-national setting?2 Must the rules governing cyberspace be
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Copyright 2000, Graeme B.
Dinwoodie. This Essay reflects discussions with participants in the Symposium or-
ganized by the Uniws jPmz)1wniaJa of Int&=om Econoc Laq Exploring
Legal Boundaries Within-Cyberspace: What Law Controls in a Global Marketplace?,
in March 2000. My t to all those who provoked or commented on these
musings. I am also very grateful to Brian Havel and Larry Helfer for comments on a
draft of this Essay.
1 Technologies being developed may permit Internet users to confine their on-
line relations to other persons from particular jurisdictions. See Denise Caruso,
Digit Conavrur Co d zer Cnten N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at CA (reporting that
the response of iCraveTV.com to complaints concerning its activities, permissible in
Canad but prohibited in the United States, was to pursue technological measures
that would bar U.S. users from accessing the Canadian website, thus creating
"country.area networks").
2 Consider, for example, the recent experience of Yahoo! in the French courts.
The sale of Nazi memorabilia is illegal in many parts of Europe, including France,
but not in the United States. A French organization filed suit mn France against Ya-
hoo! for permitting auctions of Nazi memorabilia on its U.S. site (no such auctions
took place on Yahoo!'s French site, http://www.yahoo.fr), and the French court has
ordered Yahoo! to block French consumers from access to the auctions on the U.S.
site. Yahoo! has posted warnings in French on its U.S. site in order to alert French
users of the restrictions under French law, but has argued that it is technologically
impossible to ensure that French users cannot access the U.S. site. See Association
Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, la Liue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme
v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, T.G.I. Pans, Ordonnance de r6f~re du 22 mai 2000,
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Eom L.
decoupled from national legislatures and courts to be effective or le-
gitimate? This is a hugely complex question to which scholars and
policymakers are devoting substantial attention across all fields of in-
quiry, including many areas of law?
But legal boundaries of other sorts may also be challenged by de-
velopments in cyberspace. For example, as I will explain in more de-
tail below, for over a century the United States has steadfastly resisted
adoption of a registration-based system of trademark priority and has
adhered instead to a use-based philosophy. This philosophy estab-
lishes a variety of boundaries for trademark law, many of which are
challenged by the Internet. Indeed, one could regard the
use/registration boundary itself, which separates U.S. trademark law
from the trademark law of almost all other countries, as a boundary
that is threatened by cyberspace developments. This boundary has, of
course, developed out of and been sustained by geographic bounda-
ries, but it is important to recognize that any inquiry into "what law
controls in cyberspace" must probe not only the quasi-adjectival
question of which legal system or body has legislative competence
over a particular legal issue, but also the effect that cyberspace will
have on the content of the substantive law that will control activities
in cyberspace. Philosophical and conceptual boundaries may fall just
as fast as geographic boundaries.
In this Essay, I will explore the dual dimension to boundary ero-
sion by considering the effect that one particular aspect of cyberspace
activity- the registration and use of domain names- has had and may
have on trademark law. We will see that this analysis challenges not
http://wwwJegalis.net/jnet/decisions/responsabilite/ord tgi-paris 220500.htm; see
also Inen" Yaho0 Appas Fmv Corat Deason Banming SiFe Sdlg Nazi Memrabit*,
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 12, 2000, LEXIS, News Libmry, Individual
Publication File.
3 Sea eg., WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC
LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997) (criticizing globalization for failing to con-sider a full range of social values and questioning the legitimacy of efforts to develop
global governance structures without consideration of all those values). Within the
legal profession, the American Bar Association established a Global Cyberspace Ju-
risdiction Project in 1998 to consider the appropriate jurisdictional rules to govern
electronic commerce. See A.B.A. GLOBAL CYBERSPACE JURISDICnON PRoJECr,
ACHIEIVING LEGAL AND BusINEss ORDER IN CYBERSPACE 19-20 (London Meeting
Draft) Guly 2000), at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/initiatives/jurisdiction.
html (recommending the establishment of a global commission to investigate the
issues upon which there is a "global consensus"). In 1998, the World Intellectual
Property Organization convened a conference on the private international aspects of
copyright law and the Internet, and a similar conference on all aspects of intellectual
propertyand electronic commerce is scheduled forJanuary2001 m Geneva.
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only traditional notions of national legislative competence, but also
enables us to reconsider basic debates about trademark law. I will try
to confine my thoughts to the broader systemic significance of the
clash that has occurred between domain names and trademarks; the
pace of change in this area is so rapid that a detailed analysis of cur-
rent law, though fascinating, would soon be of purely historical inter-
est.
2. THE CONFICT BETWEEN TRADEMARK AND
DOMAIN NAME REGIMES
What precisely is the conflict between trademarks and domain
names? Before examining the conflict in detail and the different ways
in which it might be addressed, I should identify the characteristics of
the two systems with which we are dealing. Domain names are the
unique addresses assigned to particular computers that are connected
to the Internet. Without such unique addresses, computers would not
be able to send packets of information to the correct location.4 The
naming system, and the history of its development, are well-explained
elsewhere5 For our current purposes, four aspects of the system are
pertinent. First, domain names currently say very little about the na-
ture or location of the domain name registrant. Every domain name
has a top-level domain name (the suffix at the end of the domain
name) that will consist of either a generic top-level domain name
(such as .edu or .com)6 or a country code (such as .uk, for the United
Kingdom, or .it, for Italy).' But, as presently constituted, even the
4 The actual Internet addresses (Internet Protocol addresses) are unique num-
bers, each with an assigned corresponding unique name m order to deal with the
frailty of human memory. Thus, tle Internet address of the University of Pennsyl-
vania is actually 128.912.28, but it is easier to remember the name that corresponds
to that number, namely, www.upenn.edu.
s SegarayJoseph P. Liu, Legtimwy a&rA todty in Imer Conmntio~r A Do-
wain Nan Case Stuy, 74 IND. Lj. 587 (1999) (discussing the history of domain
name system and proposals for reform).
6 The present generic top-level domain names include .edu, .com, .gov, .org,
.net, .int, and .mil. As discussed below, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN") has proposed the creation of a variety of new
top-level domain names. Se ifr text accompanying notes 75-76.
7 The administration of country code top-level domains is delegated by
ICANN (performing the functions formerly performed by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority ("IANA")) to authorities ("managers") in the relevant country.
For resolution of a recent controversy on the question, see IANA, IANA REPORT
ON REQUEST FOR DELEGATION OF PS TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN (Mar. 22, 2000), at
http://www.icann.org/general/ps-report-22maro.htm (concluding that the .ps
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top-level domain name is not determinative of the nature or location
of the registrant in question. Although the registrars responsible for
country code registers may impose residency requirements,8 domain
names are available in the generic top-level domains regardless of
physical location! and many country code registrars are not insistent
on residency requirements. 0 And, while the four principal generic
top-level domains were once indicative of the nature of the domain
name's owner (.edu signified 'educational institutions, .gov was found
at the end of government agency addresses, .corn was used by com-
mercial enterprises, and .mil was restricted to military users)," the ex-
pansion of users and an open registration system have reduced the
value of the suffix as an indicium of the nature of the user (except for
.edu, .gov, and Mi).
2
Second, and related to the lack of connection between address
and location, because the accreditation of registrars is performed by a
domain should be delegated to managers in the Palestinian Authority and approving
the managers for that purpose).
8 See ASSOCIATION FRANAISE POUR LE NOMMAGE INTERNET EN
COOPtRATION ("AFNIC'), NAME ALLOCATION CHARTER FOR THE .FR AREA, at
http://www.nic.fr/english/register/charter.htm- (listing conditions on name regis-
tration in the .fr country code domain) (last visited Oct. 19, 2000).
9 Indeed, registrars of the names in the generic top-level domains have mar-
keted .corn domain based on its global characteristics. See PnxisionMarket Net Dot
Corn Owr Spir a Eurpean Web, PRECISION MKT. 5 (Apr. 5, 1999), 1999 WL
8938619.
10 Some country code domains have become attractive for reasons unrelated to
geography. For: example, doctors in the United States are purchasing names in the
Moldova country code domain, namely, .md. See U.S. opara Donimte This Com-
try Name Garr, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2000, at 3D; see aso Jane Black, Tiny Tutlu
APiz firn Web Narre N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at CZ (reporting that the Pacific
island of Tuvalu had sold the right to control registration of names in its .tv country
code domain to a Canadian entrepreneur).
11 See IANA, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ("RFC') 1591, at 1 (March 1994) (de-
scribing the top-level domain structure), at http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/fc1591.txt.
12 See ICANN, NEW TLD APPLICATION PROCESS OVERVIEW, at http://www.
icann.org/tlds/application-process-03augo.htm (posted Aug. 3, 2000) (noting that
while RFC 1591 states that .com, .net, and .org are intended for various uses ...
[a]s a practical matter, however, anyone may register and use names in these do-
mains or any purpose." Indeed, many trademark owners will seek to register- or
stop others from registering- a domain name incorporating their trademark in sev-
eraI of the generic top-level domains.).
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single body, ICANN,13 there is close to (but not complete)14 uniform-
ity of registration practices among registrars, at least with respect to
the generic top-level domains. Third, -within each top-level domain,
there cannot be two identical names, or computers would not know
where to send information. Thus, while there may be separate do-
main name registrations of apple.corn and apple.net, there cannot be
two domain name registrations of apple.com. Finally, domain names
are registered on a first-come, first-served basis. There can only be
one apple.com, and it goes to the first person to register it. The only
check, on initial application, is whether an identical name is already
registered in that domain.
In some ways, the allocation of domain names may appear to
evade the dilemmas presented by cyberspace in other areas of regula-
tion, many of which (such as tax or securities law) have been discussed
in this Symposium. In particular, because the domain name system is
an element of the architecture of the Internet, domain names would
appear inevitably linked to the non-national vehicle of the Internet;
registration can be made in top-level domains without regard to na-
tional status or location. And, names are not allocated by national
governments."5 Finally, unlike other activities (such as the issuance or
13 ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation that was created by the U.S. govern-
ment to operate the domain name system, among other things, in accordance with
parameters set by the Commerce Department. See Management of Internet Names
and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (proposed June 10, 1998).
14 The flexibilitythat causes slightly different practices among registrars reflects
the notion that the system of registering generic top-level domain names would
benefit from competition in the registration process. This was an important part of
the shift from administration of the system by Network Solutions, Inc. For a de-
scription of Network Solutions, Inc., see bn-a note 51. There is less uniformity
among registrars of names in the different country code domains, but again there is
some standardization uithin a particular country code domain. See U.S. Conpa ie
Doninte This County Name Game, sura note 10, at 3D (noting different registration
practices within different country code domains).
15 National governments are more likely to be involved in the management of
country code domains. But the mnager of a country code domain need not be a
national governmental organization, Tbe appropriate managers of the country code
domains are determined in accordance with principles set out in a document (re-
ferred to as ICP-1) entitled "Internet Domain Name System Structure and Delega-
tion," at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-l.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2000). This was
issued in May 1999 to reflect then current policies of the Internet Assigned Num-
bers Authority in the administration of delegations to manage country code do-
mains. And many managers are wholly unrelated to the national government. (). id
at 2 (noting that "the desires of the government of a country with regard to delega-
tion of a [country code top-level domain] are taken very seriously .... Significandy
interested parties in the domain should agree that the proposed [top-level domain]
manager is the appropriate party.").
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trading of securities), no differing national regulatory domain name
regimes have previously been established. The domain name system
thus appears to be a ripe candidate for an approach transcending na-
tional regulation.
This impression changes, however, when trademarks are used as
domain names. Intellectual property rights traditionally have been na-
tional in nature, and there are only a few derogations from this territo-
rialist philosophy."6 Indeed, the leading international intellectual
property treaties affirm this basic proposition. Trademark rights in
one country are independent of trademark rights in other countries:
for example, a trademark registration in France secures rights in
France, but a different person may own the rights to the same mark
for the same goods in the United States. International treaties have
sought to minimize the problems that territorialism causes by facili-
tating multinational registration," protecting marks beyond the bor-
ders of the country where use or registration occurs if the mark is
well-known elsewhere,"8 ensuring that nationals of foreign countries
are equally entitled to register marks as domestic citizens,19 and man-
dating certain universal minimum standards to be implemented in the
national law of all treaty states. These provisions of international
trademark law do little, however, to erode the premise of territoriality;,
indeed, the premise underlies every one of these provisions. The use
of nationally delimited trademarks in the non-nationally delimited
domain name system thus compels consideration of which boundaries
(if any) are pertinent. So when trademarks are used as (or as part of)
16 The most notable of these is the Community Trade Mark available from the
European Union. See Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the
Community Trademark, 1994 Oj. (L 11) 1 [hereinafter the Trademark Regulation].
The Trademark Reulaton put in place a system under which an applicant may, by
filing a single application, obtain a Community Trade Mark registration ("CTM")
according rights troughout the entire territory of the European Union.
17 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at
Stockholm, 1967, art. 4, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (establishing rights of
priority; see aso Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks, adopted Apr. 14, 1891, 175 QT.S. 57; Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 28, 1989, at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/registration/protocol-madrid/protocol-madrid1-eng.
htr-l (establishing a centralized international filing system to facilitate acquisition of
national trademark rights in several countries).
18 See Paris Convention, sup'ra note 17, art. 6bis; see also Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rihts, Apr. 15, 1994 ("TRIPS Agree-
ment), art. 16, Marrakesh Agreement Establshing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1Q, Legal Instruments-Results of the UruguayRound, 33 I.LVM. 81 (1994).
19 See Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 2 (mandating national treatment).
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domain names, the domain name system can no longer avoid the
question of whether national, international, or supranational law
should determine lights where two or more parties have competing
claims. The domain name system must confront the dilemma facing
other areas of regulation, and I will discuss in Section 3 below the dif-
ferent ways in which it is doing that.
As noted above, however, domain names also challenge the con-
ceptual boundaries of trademark law. To see the ways in which this is
so, let's briefly explore the conceptual boundaries of trademark law.
A trademark identifies the goods of one producer and distinguishes
them from the goods of others.' For example, the mark APPLE on a
personal computer identifies for consumers the source of the com-
puter produced by Apple and distinguishes it from a similar product
produced by Toshiba. (Service marks do the same for services, and
are protected on essentially the same basis and for the same reasons).
Preventing rival competitors from using the term APPLE, or any con-
fusingly similar term, to identify their rival computers serves useful
social purposes: it protects the goodwill (or consumer associations)
developed by Apple with respect to its product, thus encouraging Ap-
ple to generate that goodwill by making products of consistent quality;,
and it enables consumers to receive information about the character-
istics of different products in short (and more efficient) form, thus
enabling more informed purchases by the public, who will not be de-
ceived into purchasing the wrong computer.
The realization of these two objectives- preservation of goodwill
and protection of consumers- was classically achieved under US. law
by the grant of limited rights. Trademark protection was offered only
to terms meeting certain important conditions, and the scope of pro-
tection was confined to cases of likely confusion. As to the former, a
term would only be protected by trademark law if it were distinctive:
that is, if it constituted a feature by which consumers would identify
and distinguish a product from others. Absent distinctiveness, the
purposes of trademark protection are not implicated because there
would be no goodwill attaching to the claimed mark and thus no con-
sumers who would be confused by others using the same mark.2
20 See 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1994) (defining trademark).
21 See Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 472
n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A consumer must recognize that a particularly packaged product
comes from Source A before she can be confused by a similar package from Source
B.").
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Similarly, U.S. law required (and still requires)' that the trademark
owner use the mark on the goods in respect of which the rights were
claimed. Without use, consumers would not develop the associations
with a single producer upon which the need for protection is prem-
ised. The use-based philosophy of U.S. trademark law, reflected in
this second prerequisite for protection, also affects the rule of priority.
the first producer to use the mark obtains the rights with respect to
the goods upon which and geographical areas in which use occurred.
Most other countries have adopted a registration-based system of
trademark priority- the first to register the mark obtains the exclusive
right to use the mark on the goods in question.
This attention to use by a mark owner also affects attitudes toward
scope of rights, such as a willingness to grant protection against use
on different goods, and from that a natural receptivity to dilution
protection.24 Because confusion was an essential element to the phi-
losophy underlying protection, the scope of U.S. trademark rights was
limited both by reference to the products on which the mark was used
and by reference to the geographic area in which the mark was used.
But these limits can also be rationalized as flowing from the use-based
philosophy- the first to use the mark obtains the rights uith rspet to
de goods upon vhih and geographica1 aeas in vhid use axinai And each of
these limits also reflected a desire to restrain the activities of legitimate
traders only to the extent necessary to further the two primary pur-
poses of trademark law. If the products upon which the mark was
used were wholly different from those of the first mark owner, the
public would not purchase the goods of the second producer believing
them to be those of the first producer. Thus, although Apple owns
the mark APPLE for personal computers, a manufacturer of shoes
could use the mark APPLE on shoes without affecting the goodwill
22 The "intent to use" system introduced in the 1988 Trademark Law Revision
Act enables applications to be made prior to use, but registrations will not be issued
prior to use. See 15 U.S.C § 1051 (1994) (establishing conditions on issuance of
registration based upon intent to use application).
23 This is not to say that use is irrelevant in registration-based systems. For ex-
ample, although use is not required to secure a registration in such systems, it may
be required within a set penod-to maintain a registration or to bring an infringement
proceeding. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECrUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY (forthcoming 2000).
24 See grally Daniel C Schulte, Tbe Madrid Traderk A gmrerm,'s Basis in Regis.
tradiorBased S)stns: Does the Pmti Omwnw Past Biases? (Part I), 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 595, 608-10 (1995) (discussing several wel-recognized
limitations, both on the ability to acquire rights and the scope of rights acquired,
which flow from the use-based philosophy of U.S. trademark law).
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established by the Apple company or deceiving consumers in their
purchasing decisions. DOMINO'S is used for both pizzas and sugar
without harm to either company (despite efforts to suggest other-
'wise).2 To use an example on the services side, United Airlines and
United Van Lines each own trademark rights in the mark UNITED,
for airline services and moving services, respectively 6
Limits on the geographic scope of rights were similarly motivated:
if Apple computer did not use its mark in State A, then consumers in
State A would not come to associate the mark APPLE -with the prod-
ucts made by the Apple company, and thus the use of the term- even
by another computer producer- would not confuse consumers or
endanger any consumer perceptions of the quality of the product of
the Apple company (because there are no such perceptions). This
geographic limit became much less significant 'with the advent of fed-
eral trademark registration under the Lanham Act in 1946 because an
application for federal trademark registration is, if successful, treated
as nationwide constructive use? (This development recognizes the
increasingly national nature of trade, and serves to protect the ability
of a producer to expand into other areas of the United States without
having to change its trademark to avoid infringing local marks.)28 But
the principle still operates periodically to limit the scope of owners'
rights.
The domain name system presents a series of conflicts with these
basic principles of U.S. trademark law. There can only be one
united.com; should that domain name be granted to the airline or the
moving company, or should prior trademark ownership be irrelevant?
25 See Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969, 975-80 (5th
Cr. 1980) peritting coexistence of Domino's Sugar and Domino's Pizza because,
inter alia, odifferences in goods sufficient to avoid consumer confusion).
26 See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2017727 (airline); U.S. Trademark Reg-
istration No. 1792966 (moving company).
27 See 15 U.S.C S 1057(c) (1994) (providing that the filing of an application to
register a trademark constitutes constructive use of the mark).
28 The exception to this rule is the good faith remote junior user, who retains
rights in the area of its local use notwithstanding federal registration by another pro-
ducer. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus C., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918)
(noting common law rule and exception).
29 The extent to which this remains a problem may depend on the maintenance
of the current architecture of the Intemet. For example, where more than one
trademark holder (or other person) has a legitimate claim to united.com, that address
may take the user to a registrar-administered site listing (and linking to the sites of)
all claimants to the UNITED name, relegating those users to concurrent use of
united.corn and exclusive use only of some other configuration including "united".
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What is the geographic scope of use where a trademark is used as a
domain name: has the user now made use of the mark globally, po-
tentially causing the acquisition of rights in all use-based systems3" and
infringement of rights in all countries where the mark is owned by an-
other?3 Both of these questions implicate fundamental issues about
the continuing role of "use" in trademark law, a topic upon which the
United States increasingly stands alone in international circles. The
Internet may increase pressure on the United States to revisit its long-
standing insistence on use as the governing principle of trademark
protection.
The domain name system, and its operation apart from the trade-
mark system, will also require the courts to develop new responses to
old questions. For example, how does one assess confusion in cyber-
space? The courts must construct a cyberconsumer, whose purchas-
ing and browsing habits clearly encompass the use of domain names
as well as trademarks in the searching process 2 And, if use retains
any importance in the system of trademark protection, then how does
one assess whether a trademark is being "used" in cyberspace: is reg-
istration of a domain name the "use of a mark in commerce" suffi-
30 This would principally be the United States, but even countries operating
registration-based trademark systems mnay offer some protection to markis used but
not registered under common law principles of passing off or unfair competition.
Sw DINWOODIE ET AL, supra note 23.
31 Efforts are underway within the World Intellectual Property Organization to
develop an international approach to the question of when Intemet use of a mark
(whether as a domain name or otherwise) 'will be treated as use within a particular
country. Se Standing Comm. on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and
Geographical Indications, Su ay by the Chair, Fifth Session, Geneva, Sept. 11-
15, 2000, WPO Doc. SCT/5/5, at 2 Se t. 15, 2000), at http://www.wipo.int/eng/
document/sct/index 5.htm (noting Committee discussion of draft provisions on
the protection of trdemarks on the Internet and reporting that the International
Bureau would refine the provisions for discussion at the Sixth Session of the Stand-
ing Committee); see also Standing Comm. on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial De-
signs and Geographical Indications, Memorandum prepared by the International
Bureau on the Protection of Industrial Property Rights in Relation to the Use of
Signs on the Intemet, Fifth Session, Geneva, Sept. 11-15, 2000, WIPO Doc.
SCT/5/2 (June 21, 2000), at http://eforum.wipo.insceng/docs/sct5 2e.pdf
(discussing draft provisions, 'which would require tt Intemet use have a "comi er-
cial effect" in a particular country before being treated as "use" there, and develop-
ing guidelines on the meaning of"commercial effect"). These discussions have also
encompassed the question of how to accommodate conflicting national rights. Seeid
32 These habits may, however, change as technological options for cyber-
searching grow. The use of keywords, available with different browsers, for exam-
ple, altered the reliance of consumers on domain names. See Andy Johnson-Laird,
L okixg Fanw7ja L egislatLngBackmai?, 4 J. SmALL& &EMERGiNG Bus. L. 95 (2000).
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cient either to acquire trademark rights33 or (if that mark is owned by
another) to infringe trademark rights? Again, this will require courts
to apply classical principles with an eye to new consumer practices.
Whether and to what extent domain names will serve as trademarks is
not a question of abstract philosophy, but a matter of how consumer
practices and comprehension develop in cyberspace. Even in the last
few years, consumer attitudes about what a domain name signifies
have changed; trademark law must reflect those changes.
Thus, the different aspects of the domain name system challenge
trademark scholars, policymakers, and courts to consider fundamental
questions about the nature of our.trademark system, as well as the ap-
plication of traditional trademark tests to new contexts. But why is
this so big a deal? We have seen that the principles of the trademark
system and the domain name system are different. But why should
that be of concern? The systems are designed to achieve different re-
sults, so their divergence on basic approaches should be neither sur-
prising nor troubling. Correct? Perhaps.
Increasingly, the registration and use of domain names is becom-
ing an integral part of branding (i.e., trademark) strategies pursued by
producers and providers of services. This is particularly true of serv-
ice industries. For example, it is difficult for an airline to compete in
the market for web-savvy consumers if it does not own the domain
name corresponding to its trademark United Airlines could register
the domain name flywithunited.com and spend time (and money)
educating consumers that its website with fare information could be
found at that address. But many consumers have become acclimated
to searching initially by typing in the trademark of the company plus
the .com suffix. Although there are numerous other domain names
that United can register that would connote an airline, preventing its
use of the trademark that it owned would put it at a competitive dis-
advantage.?' In short, the differences between the trademark and do-
33 See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
EXAMINATION GUIDE No. 2-99: MARKS COMPOSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, OF
DOMAIN NAMES (Sept. 29, 1999) (discussing "issues that commonly arise in the ex-
amination of domain name mark applications"), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/tac/notices/guide299.htm.
QC Stephen L. Carter, The Truble vith Trademrk, 99 YALE Lj. 759, 770
(1990) (arguing that because some marks are better than others, competitors vwithout
access to those marks encounter higher information costs and thus barriers to mar-
ket entr).
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main name systems lead to these (and other)3" social costs ex post; if
these are costs that can be reduced by one system having regard to the
other ex ante, then some coordination is clearly worthwhile.
3. ADDRESSING THE CoNFLiCr
3.1. Spatial B laries
Scholars addressing the effect of the Internet on spatial bounda-
ries have largely concentrated (as one might expect) on several di-
chotomous questions. Should problems of dueling national claims to
regulate activities in cyberspace be solved by national, international, or
supranational devices? Does prescriptive power in cyberspace legiti-
mately belong to existing offline political institutions or to evolving
online communities?" Which connection must a state have to an is-
35 These may arise, most obviously, from the voluminous litigation that we wit-
nessed starting in the mid-1990s, or from transactions that commercial actors oper-
ating in the digital environment effect to avoid the uncertainty of the clash of the
two systems. QC S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999) (noting that trademark owners
often purchase domain names containing their trademarks from the registrant rather
than litigate). Other costs might include a significant chilling effect on political
speech as limits on trademark nights taken for granted in the offline world assume
uncertain status online.
36 The examples that I have mentioned raise two separate, but obviously re-
lated, issues. First, to what extent does the domain name system take into accountexisting trademark ownership in order to preserve that competitive equilibrium?
Second, prospectively, to what extent should the allocation of domain names and
trademarks be aligned to avoid these problems in the future? Underlyg both
questions is a continuing concem about ensuring within any such system sufficient
space for uses by competitors, consumers, and the public that preserve the uses by
these constituencies thought important in the offline environment.
37 Political structures are clearly evolving in cyberspace. Sa; eg, ICANN,
PRELIMINARY REPORT: MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN YOKOHAMA (July 16,
2000) (approving resolution on bylaws regarding membership), at http://www.icann
.org/mnutes/prelim-report-16jf00.htm; c Farhad Manjoo,Juy Still Ot on E/kk.,
WIRED NEWS (Oct. 11, 2000) (discussing concerns with and successes of online
voting for election to ICANN Board), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,39283,00.html. The completeness of these structures and their capacity to
further liberal democratic values, however, have been well-critiqued. Se, eg, Neil
W. Netanel, Ctsnpae SeCGowmnz A Skeptiad Viewfivm Libernl Demutic 7boy
88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 435 (2000) (critiquing claim that a self-governing cyberspace
would more fully realize liberal democratic ideals); s&, also Mark K. Anderson, .ikcag?
to Sue Vote A udiore, W[RED NEWS (Oct. 12, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,39431,00.htm1 (reporting lawsuit by election officials in Chi-
cago against Voteauction.com, a website purporting to auction off 15,000 votes in
the presidential election).
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sue or dispute in order best to support its claim to regulate in cyber-
space?
The solutions canvassed by scholars addressing these questions
have ranged widely. Some, such as Jack Goldsmith, have argued that
the question of competing national prescriptive claims to regulate can
be resolved by application of traditional private law techniques such as
choice of law and jurisdictional analysis." Others, such as David
Johnson and David Post, have moved beyond such techniques and
suggested that activities in cyberspace be regulated by cybernorms of a
more universal character?9  Yet others have argued' that Congress
might consider expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts to ex-
ercise jurisdiction4 ' extratem-itorially (which the U.S. courts currently
do more readily in trademark cases than they do in copyright cases4Z).
In the context of domain name/trademark disputes, principles
have developed at the national, international, and supranational levels.
Many different national courts have addressed the registration of do-
main names including trademarks by persons other than the mark
owner. But while national courts throughout the world have consis-
38 Jack L. Goldsmith, Againt Cyberanairy, 65 U. C-I. L. REV. 1199, 1201
(1998). On the conceptual rather than spatial side, others have argued that cyber-
space is best regulated by application of existing legal principles, including those of
inftellectual property law. See Frank H Easterbrook, C*ac and the Law of the
Hoare 1996 U. CHI. LEGALF. 207,208 (1996).
39 See David K. Johnson & David Post, LawaniBordm- The Rise ofLaw in Cy
betsa, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1996).
40 See Subxnnitee TadeleJwsditionssus onIren 60 Pat. Trademark & Copy-
right J. (BNA) 214, 215 (uly 14, 2000) (reporting testimony of Dan Burk at an over-
sight hearing before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property).
41 Even if Congress expanded the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts, U.S. courts have recognized that the Internet has not entirely removed limits
on the constitutional authority of courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over for-
eign defendants. See, eg, Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th
Or. 1997) (explaining passive website jurisdictional analysis by several courts);
America Online, Inc. v. Huang, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560, 1568-69 (E.D. Va.
2000) (holding that registration of a domain name with a registrar based in Virginia
was of itself insufficient contact with Virginia to support personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendant/domain name registrant); BroadBridge Media, L.L.CQ v. Hy-
percd.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (S.DI\.Y. 2000).
42 See Curtis A. Bradley, Terimiatreial PropetyRi& in anA ge oflohrlis
37 VA. J. INT' L. 505, 526 (1997) ("[T]he courts have held that there can be no
violation of U.S. copyright law without an act of infringement within the United
States.... [IT]his is not the case with respect to U.S. trademark law.") (citation
omitted).
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tently offered relief against blatant cybersquatting, 3 differences in the
precise contours of national protection are likely to develop as courts
confront more contentious issues in disputes between competing
mark owners or mark owners and other legitimate users. The issue
has been tackled at the international level by the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO"). In September 1999, WIPO mem-
ber states agreed to a nonbinding resolution calling for the per se
protection of well-known marks against bad faith registration as part
of the domain names of someone other than the mark owner.4 But,
even if this form of "soft law" has the long-term effect that WIPO
hopes, it will simply ensure that most countries offer basic protection
against infringement of famous marks. Implementation of that pro-
tection will remain a matter for national law, and (as the number of
reservations noted in the resolution suggests) there exists wide dis-
agreement over the appropriate scope of protection for marks beyond
very basic notions.
If this were all, national law would remain paramount, as it still
does in almost all other areas of intellectual property law.4 This
43 Se' eg, Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495
(2d Cir. 2000), mt dazig 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000); Panavision Int'l, L.P., v. Toeppen,
141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998); Landgericht Dusseldorf, GRUR 34 0 191/96
(Apr. 4, 1997), 158 (Germany), epotrtat 1998 Eur. CL.Y.B. 963, 963 (May 1998);
Yahoo! Inc. v. Akash Arora, [1999] Fleet St. Rep. 931,939 (Delhi IC 1999) (India).
Most recently, courts in China have offered strong protection against cybersquatting.
On June 20, 2000, Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court IP Chamber upheld a
complaint by the Swedish furniture retailer IKEA and ruled that the domain name
registration www.ikea.com.cn was null and void, and ordered the defendant,
CINET, to withdraw the registration. Although the court noted no specific law in
China governing disputes between trademarls and domain names, it applied the
"spirit and principles" of the law and found that the defendant had vlated the
spirit of the Paris Convention and the basic principles of the unfair competition law.
First FoydrelatedDomain Nae Dispute A mz a- IKEA Raeiw Fawra eJzger
[sic], CHINA IP EXPRESS (Rouse & Co. Intl, Beijing, Chiina), June 22, 2000; see also
P& G Won Suit A gimt CQ ,quau..for Donuin Nan ' 'ubisper cwcn", CHINA IP
EXPRESS (Rouse & Co. Intl, Beijing, China), July 7, 2000 (reporting similar case
where the court additionally took into account that the defendant haa violated the
Interim Rules for the Registration and Administration of Chinese Domain Names).
44 See Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-
Known Marks, art. 6, Gen. Rep. of the Assembs. of the Member States of WIPO,
Thirty-Fourth Series of Meetings, Geneva, Sept. 20-29, 1999, 171-183, WIPO
Doc. A/34/16 (Sept. 29, 1999), at http://www. wipo.int.
45 Some supranational rights do exist, such as the CTM. See The Trademark
Regulation, supra note 16. Moreover, the incororation of the international intel-
lectual property regime within the internationaf trading system, and in particular
within the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), has made the standards contained in international agreements effective
for the first time. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body has now issued four reports
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would cause reliance on traditional private law techniques of jurisdic-
tion, choice of law, and recognition of judgments, to localize and ad-
judicate non-national disputes before national courts according to na-
tional laws. As noted above, some scholars see this endeavor as
scarcely different from that encountered in any multinational or multi-
state context.46 And, to be sure, policy makers and scholars are
working on adapting these techniques for the Internet age.4
But complete reliance on national standards, guided by traditional
choice of law techniques, maybe insufficient. Even if (as some argue)
determining the law applicable to a domain name/trademark clash
does indeed bear similarity to other choice of law dilemmas, at some
point differences in degree become differences in kind. The Internet
takes us across that line. Traditional approaches to choice of law have
significant problems of application and provide little guidance to
courts in the digital environment.48 (Indeed, where the issue has sur-
faced in domain name cases brought before the U.S. courts, the courts
have largely ignored the issue.4 ) And the aggressive exercise of ex-
interpreting the scope of member state obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, in-
cluding three published since March 2000. See WTO Panel Report, United States-
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Doc. No. WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000),
at http://www.wto.orgwto/-ddflep/publc.html; W1T Panel Report, Canada-
Term of Patent Protection, Doc. No. WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000), at http://www.
wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html; WTO Panel Report, Canada- Patent Protection
of Pharmaceutical Products, Doc. WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000), at http://www.
wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.htmil; WTO Appellate Body Report, India-Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Doc.
WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997), at http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.
html. While these rulings do not directly effect changes in national law, an rights
remain enforceable by private parties only as permitted by national laws (whether
TRIPS compliant or not), the threat of effective enforcement means that one can
with greater confidence now refer to de facto intemational legal standards of intel-
lectual property protection. (The nonbinding resolution of the WIPO member
states is not, however, directly enforceable before a WITO panel. See Joint Resolu-
tion Concering Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, supra note 44.)
46 See Goldsmith, supra note 38.
47 See Easterbrook, supra note 38; Goldsmith, supra note 38; Johnson & Post,
supra note 39; Sutxonnitiee Tale Juisdiction Issues on Inem., supa note 40; A.B.A.
GLOBAL CYBERSPACE JURISDICTON PROJECT, supa note 3; see also iifa text accom-
panying note 55 (discussing the draft Hague Convention).
48 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copygt Order Wy Natiud Caats Shld
Crate Glot-d Nomr, 149 U. PA. L. REV. (forticoming 2000).
49 See Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int'l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1115 (ND.
Cal. 1999) (granting the licensee of the U.S. trademark for the mark AMERICNS
CUP a temporaryrestraining order against the New Zealand operator of a website at
amencascup.com, notwithstanding that the use of the mark AMERICASCUP was
lawful under New Zealand law).
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traterritorial jurisdiction would merely heighten tensions with other
countries and highlight the urgency of more reasoned, and less paro-
chial, solutions.
On the other hand, the isolated application of autonomous, uni-
versal cybernorms causes other problems. Just as cyberspace creates
spillover effects from one country to another, it also causes spillover
from online to offline contexts, implicating more than merely cyber-
interests. Online activities have offline consequences, legitimating on-
line (national) regulation. National interests have a role to play in the
development of international solutions. Passing over them too
quickly disserves a truly international solution by ignoring helpful
laboratories of laws, failing to take advantage of developed democratic
political structures that nation states (on the whole) provide,"0 and ig-
noring the legitimate claims of nation states to (partial) legislative
competence.
The domain name system does, however, include a form of su-
pranational adjudication in addition to the national and international
mechanisms discussed above. When the US. Government estab-
lished ICANN, it required that ICANN devise a mandatory uniform
dispute resolution policy.5' Thus, when ICANN accredited additional
registrars to administer the generic top-level domains, it required each
registrar to adopt the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP").
The UDRP establishes an arbitration process by requiring domain
name registrants to submit to arbitration before one of the ICANN-
approved dispute resolution providers as a condition of registration,
And it contains a set of principles (both substantive and procedural)
according to which disputes between registrants and mark owners are
to be resolved.
50 It is not clear that the different constituencies comprising the fledgling politi-
cal structure of ICANN serve as any better proxy than nations for the different in-
terests that are implicated in this context. And the structure of ICANN raises many
other concerns regarding the body's legitimacy and representativeness. See
COMMON CAUSE & CMTt FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH, ICANN's GLOBAL
ELECTIONS: ON THE INTERNET, FOR THE INTERNET (March 2000), at http://
www.cdt.org/dns/icann/study/icannstudy.pdf.
51 Before the U.S. government established ICANN, responsibility for register-
ing .com. domain names- the most valuable names- lay with Network Solutions,
Inc. (to whom the government had outsourced the job). Network Solutions imple-
mented its own dispute resolution policy, which it revised to the satisfaction of al-
most no one. For a description of the operation of these different policies, see Liu,
supra note 5, at 606-08.
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The UDRP holds the promise of supranational laws and suprana-
tional adjudication 2 Indeed, the UDRP has been seen by some as a
model for cross-border enforcement of rights on the Internet more
generally?3 The UDRP, however, was intended only to put in place
quick and cheap administrative procedures for the easy cases- those
concerning obviously abusive registrations of trademarks as domain
names (loosely, cybersquatting). Some more difficult problems have
been presented (although not always recognized) by fact patterns al-
ready brought before panels. But as soon as the facts go beyond the
easy cases and begin to embrace contentious issues of trademark law,
the UDRP may be severely tested. For example, trademark protec-
tion, especially for words, collides with free speech concerns. Al-
though there exists a broad-based international commitment to the
core principles of free speech, different countries deal with the colli-
sion in different ways, reflecting the wide range of free speech notions
that exist around the world once we move beyond those core princi-
ples. And the UDRP system does not presently require us to venture
into the murky waters of enforcement because the remedies (transfer
of domain name) are limited to those that can be effectuated by the
registrars without the aid of national courts. Finally, expansion of the
system would also make any procedural inequities of the current sys-
tem more significant; complaints about these inequities have been
largely ignored given the system's preoccupation with easy cases.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the WIPO has recently recog-
nized that the UDRP would be more difficult to replicate in areas
other than abusive domain name registration because of the more
contested nature of the issues that would have to be addressed.' It is
52 Supantional laws can exist without supranational adjudication (for example,
fnaonlcourts seek to uphold supranationalprinciples); and supranational adjudi-
cation can exist without supranationial law (if the UJDRP panels applied the national
law with the greatest interest, rather than an autonomous set of principles). See gerally Brian F. Havel, 7he Comtiion in an Era qfSupna tiomlAd ication, 78 N.C L.REV. 257 (2000) (discuss'mg how supranational adjudication can be viewed as a con-
stitutional exercise of judicial 
power).
53 See Subxrmitee Tackls Jurisdiction Issues on InimXt4 supra note 40, at 215 (re-
porting testimony at an oversight hearing before the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Propert . As a consequence, the opera-
tion of the UDRP and its broader significance warrants immediate scholarly atten-
tion.
54 WIPO has begun a new process to consider expansion of the UDRP to new
issues raised by domain name registration. See Press Release, WIPO, WIPO to
Probe New Issues Relating to Domain Name Abuse (July 10, 2000) (announcing a
study, to be conducted at the request of various member states, of whether the
scope of the UDRP should be broadened to address cases such as those involving
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in part because of this that the UDRP system was consciously more
limited in reach. Once vested with adjudicative authority, however,
panelists may move beyond that limited jurisdiction. Indeed, it may
be difficult for panelists to avoid doing so when certain arguments are
made to them. The institutional momentum may thus take UDRP
into cyberwaters that were not envisaged (or that were even expressly
disavowed) as proper subjects of its attention.
In the short term (and, perhaps, in the longer term), these uncer-
tainties suggest a need for an amalgam of national and supranational
influences and input. This can occur at the legislative stage, but to be
responsive to the demands of the fast-changing nature of this area of
the law, it must also occur elsewhere. This includes the use of forms
of supranational adjudication (such as the UDRP), regard for proper
choice of law analysis in all fora, and the development of more stan-
dard rules for the recognition of judgments."
The current system of domain name/trademark litigation, in large
part, reflects this variety of forces. For example, national courts have
continued to offer relief notwithstanding the UDRP.5" Arbitration
under the UDRP is nominally nonbinding. Filing a claim under the
UDRP does not prevent filing of a complaint before a national
tpersonal names of celebrities or geographical indications of origin), awilabe at
ttp://www--wipo.org/eng/pressrel/2000/p235.htm.
5 Since 1996, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has been
considering a draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(adopted by Special Commission on Oct. 30, 1999), aiiabe at http://www.
hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html. A diplomatic conference to adopt the con-
vention had been scheduled for late 2000, but the United States indicatedits unease
with the current draft (which is closely modeled on the Brussels Convention that
operates within Europe), and adoption will not occur until 2001 at the earliest. See
Negotiations at the Hague Conf. or a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recogni-tion and Enforcement of Foreign Civi Rights Before the House Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Prope of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the HR, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
International Taw, U.S. Department of State), ailable at http://www.house.ov
/judiciary/kova0629.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2000). Although the Convention
would address both jurisdiction and recognition of judgments, the interest of the
United States lies primarily in the development of recognition rules. At present, U.S.
courts are far more generous in recognizing foreign judgments thari are foreign
courts in recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments. The quid pro quo for this im-
provement would be changes (i.e., restrictions) to the bases upon which U.S. courts
could assume jurisdiction over civil disputes. For an analysis of the Convention de-
bate, see Kevin M. Clermont, Jdis&i Salmdon ani the Hague Trety, 85 CORNELL
L. REv. 89, 97-123 (1999).
56 Seesutra text accompanying note 43 (noting different national decisions).
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court.'7 And national courts can address broader issues than can pan-
elists under the UDRP. In the United States, the weapons available to
trademark owners (discussed below) were expanded (almost simulta-
neously with the commencement of UDRP panels) by the enactment
of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 1999, codified as
Section 43(d) of the Lanham Act5 Section 43(d) is not coterminous
with the UDRP, nor does either of those provisions parallel precisely
Section 43 as it stood before 1999. These differences minimize the
chance that any one regime could become supreme in regulating the
domain name/trademarks clash.59 And this may be appropriate both
in terms of democratic legitimacy and in working toward an appropri-
ate and effective non-national solution to a problem that is largely (but
not wholly) non-national in nature.
3.2. Cnt1d Bc=2aries
Trademark law, especially in use-based systems such as the United
States, is generally cautious about the dispensation of rights. Trade-
mark rights are granted only -when the term in question assumes cer-
tain affirmative characteristics (if they act as source-identifiers); absent
such characteristics, the mark is insufficiently important to protect,
because protecting it would restrain the use by others for no gain in
terms of informational shortcuts. Similarly, some marks or devices are
too important to protect by trademark, either because their allocation
to a single market participant would be anticompetitive or would col-
lide with other important values such as the First Amendment or the
57 See BroadBridge Media, L.L.C v. Hypercd.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426,
1428-29 (SDN.Y. 2000) (holding that the pendency of an arbitration under the
UDRP does not foreclose a concurrent court action under the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act); Weber-Stephen Prods. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg.
Supply, 54 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA) 1766, 1768 (ND. Ill. 2000) (holding that administra-
tive decisions under the UDRP are not intended to be inding on federal courts);
UDRP Rule 4(k) (establishing that a proceeding under the UDRP does not preclude
either party from pursuing an action in a court of cometent jurisdiction). Despite
this, since its introduction, the UDRP has often been the primary avenue for recov-
ery of a domain name. The contractual basis of the proceedings, see supra text ac-
companying notes 51-52, and the crucial (if limited) nature of the relief av ailable (i.e.,
the transfer of the domain name) undoubtedly have contributed to that popularity
with mark owners. Troublesome questions of enforcing court judgments against
registrars in other countries are sidestepped.
58 See i-ra text accompanying note 72.
5 The extent to which national alternatives are used will depend in large part
on whether they are more favorable to mark owners than the non-national UDRP
system. C Dinwoodie, supra note 48 (discussing similar dynamic with respect to
arbitration of copyright disputes).
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integrity of the patent system. The domain name, as we saw above, is
not nearly as cautious. It dispenses rights with abandon.
The clash between these two systems could be dealt with simply
by assimilating one system to the other. Assimilation to the trademark
system (or, at least, to the trademark system of the United States)
would involve the erection of barriers or hurdles to the registration of
domain names. It might take the form, for example, of requiring do-
main name registrars to conduct searches akin to trademark clearance
searches before registering a domain name. But this would duplicate
the role of the trademark authorities and would impose costs on an
activity (domain name registration) whose ease and inexpensiveness
has contributed to the rapid pace of Intemet development.'" Large
costs would slow down that development (although there may be a
time when some slowdown is appropriate). A somewhat less costly
alternative would be to require a search for the precise string of al-
phanumeric symbols and to deny domain name registration to any ap-
plication that consists of such a term. Trademark owners have sought
this form of protection at different stages of the construction of the
domain name system. Although this would keep costs lower by re-
ducing the discretionary part of any search function, it would provide
stronger rights than even the current form of dilution protection be-
cause it would grant plenary rights in words; even dilution analysis in-
volves consideration of the goods in question, and, in any event, is
available only to famous marks.6 (This latter altemative might also
6) One smaller aspect of such an assimilation might be to prevent the registra-
tion of generic terms, but this too would add costs. This differs from the famous
name proposal in that it would prevent the registration of generic names by any do-
main name registrant; the famous mark proposal would reserve the domain name
for the mark owner.
61 Restricting this domain name filter to famous marks would introduce a dis-
cretionary feature to registration analysis and would increase registration costs.
Also, it also might not be much of a filter if early cases under the federal dilution law
are any guide. Many of these cases paid scant attention to the famousness require-
ment. See Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment, Juidial rerpntation of the Faeral Tranrmrk
DitutionAct q1995, 66 U. QN. L. REv. 659, 690 (1998) (discussing approach to the
requirement of fame in the first federal dilution cases). One alternative might be to
construct an international register of famous or well-known marks, administered b
WIPO, to which registrars could turn. The device of such a register was considered,
well before the domain name issue became a focus of attention, by the WIPO
Committee of Experts on Well-Known Marks (meeting in Geneva in 1995 and
1996). It was not pursued in the resolution that represented the culmination (thus
far) of that Committee of Experts process, but it has been revived in the domain
name debate. See Joint Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of
Well-Known Marks, supra note 44, 171-183.
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alter parasitic activity only marginally, by encouraging "typosquatting"
rather than "pure" cybersquatting.)
Moreover, in any proposal to assimilate the domain name system
to the trademark system, the national nature of trademarks becomes
problematic. Against which register should the domain name be
compared? One option would be to create international registers,
which might work where the exclusion is of a small number of terms,
such as those that are either generic or well-known. Another would
be to mimic the structure of the (supranationa) European Union
Community Trademark ("CTM') and permit registration only when
no conflicting right appears in any country if a conflicting right ap-
pears, the registrant would be restricted to national country code do-
mains. But the cost of clearing marks remains a problem with the
CTM63 so this may be a particularly unhelpful model. And the need
to clear a domain name from conflicting rights everywhere is simply
too arduous to contemplate. Does this suggest, therefore, that the as-
similation must be of trademark law to the system of domain name
allocation?
Assimilating trademark law to the domain name system would re-
quire a significant change in our trademark law. It would require a
change (in US. law) to a first-to-file system, and it would require con-
sideration of assigning rights on something other than a national basis.
With respect to domain names including existing marks, there would
be too many potential owners based on their national rights. Who
would get to own the UNITED mark The first to file the domain
name registration in the .com. domain? In the .net domain? Would
national mark owners with legitimate claims to the UNITED mark
have to forfeit their marks? And, even prospectively, do we wish
trademark rights in words, the legitimacy of which depends in large
part on the porous nature of such rights, to be strengthened in line
with the truly exclusive character of domain names? Trademarks are
an increasingly important part of both political and commercial
speech, and the absolutism of the domain name system does not ac-
62 The term was coined by AndyJohnson-Laird. SeJohnson-Laird, supra note
32, at 101 (defining "typosquatting" as the act, by companies, of registenng mis-
typed variations o plar domain names to "catch the electronic crumbs dropped
by careless web surfers"). Whether typosquatting should be regarded as actionable
under the Lanham Act may depend in large part on how courts develop the notion
of cyberconsumer confusion.
63 Cf Coralie Smets-Gary & Katharina Von Woellwarth, Pros and Cons ja Corn
nm~Ty Tradermk, 20 FRANcHISE L.J. 17, 20 (2000) (discussing cost and other disad-
vantages of the CTM).
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commodate these countervailing concerns. If trademark law dis-
pensed rights as liberally as does the domain name system- giving
rights in the generic term "loan" to money lenders, for example- the
competitive climate would be significantly affected. Trademark law,
which affects more than just the right to select one's Internet address,
properly recognizes that some words are just too important for sole
ownership, either because such words appropriate an entire product
market to a single producer or because such words cannot serve a
trademark function for consumers."
Alternatively, therefore, one may recognize that the domain name
system and the trademark system can operate in tandem: first, by as-
signing domain names on a basis designed to facilitate Internet devel-
opment; and second, by applying trademark principles to acts of do-
main name registration that impact trademark rights.6' The initial
response of courts in the United States to the clash between domain
name owners and mark owners has mirrored this approach. Courts
have used not only classical principles of trademark law but also
trademark dilution protection. With respect to the latter, the courts
have interpreted the federal dilution statute in ways that have had the
effect of protecting trademark rights broadly in the digital environ-
ment. It was only later that Congress, through specific federal legisla-
tion, enacted separate rights specifically designed to protect mark
owners against cybersquatting. 6
A claim for trademark infringement or dilution requires that the
defendant has used the mark within the meaning of the Lanham Act.
Although registration of a domain name does not of itself constitute
use in commerce, early U.S. courts addressing domain name/trade-
mark conflicts stretched the notion of use in commerce to cover egre-
gious cybersquatting activities." The lack of any real use made it diffi-
cult to fashion a claim of consumer confusion (although clearly such a
64 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Roceptdizi' the Inbxem Dis6xis f Pmlu
Design Trade Dres, 75 N.C L. REV. 471, 597-602 (1997) (discussing these two ration-
ales for the doctrine of generic marks and comparing to the doctrine of functional-
it).
65 Some commentators have doubted whether this approach is likely to develop
in light of statutory and international developments. See Jessica Litman, The DNS
Was: Trademrks and the Imemet Dormin Nam Sjst 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 149, 164 (2000).
66 See Anticybesquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 5 1125(d)
(West Supp. 2000).
67 Se; eg, Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that the offer to sell domain names to trademark owners whose
marks were incorporated in the domain names was use in commerce).
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claim is possible where the domain name registrant uses the name).
And, early on, courts seized on a single line of the legislative history of
the federal dilution statute68 to support the notion that the dilution law
enacted in 1995 was aimed in part at abusive domain name registra-
tion- without any real consideration of whether the particular mark in
question was famous, or whether the use in question diluted the dis-
tinctiveness of the mark,69 both of which (along with use in com-
merce) are prerequisites for a dilution claim. Indeed, this trend was so
pervasive that some commentators started to reconceptualize dilution
case law as covering three cases: tarnishment, blurring, and cyber-
squatting!' Despite these largely pro-mark owner developments-
and perhaps to avoid this level of creativity in adjudication- the new
legislation (the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act) creates a
cause of action based on bad faith registration of a domain name that
is identical or confusingly similar to the plaintiff's trademark (without
any requirement of famousness, consumer confusion, dilution, or use
in commerce)!' It also introduced an action in rem against the do-
main name, which is intended to address (and is limited to) the situa-
tion where the defendant is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the U.S. courts'
If we adopt the notion of revising the systems separately, how-
ever, it would not prevent decisions made in one sphere from affect-
ing the development of principles in the other!3 In particular, deci-
68 See 141 CONG. REC. S19312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("[Ilt is my hope that this antidilution statute can help stem the use of de-
ceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associ-
ated with the products and reputations of others.").
69 qC. Krafte-Jacobs, sup-a note 61.
70 See 4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETiTON S 24.67 (4th ed. 1997).
71 In the case of famous marks, protection extends against acts of bad faith
registration of a domain name that is dilutive of the famous mark. See 15 U.S.CA.
1125(d) (West Supp. 2000).
7 See 15 U.S.CA 5 1125(d)(2) (West Supp. 2000). The provision has been use-
ful for trademark owners, even where narrowly interpreted by the courts. See
BroadBridge Media, L.L.C v. Hypercd.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1441
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. S§ 1125(d)(1)-(2)) (ordering registrar to transfer
the domain name to the plaintiff despite requiring in rem plaintiff to show that de-
fendant domain name registrant, over whom the court had no personal jurisdiction,
had a bad faith intent to profit from the registered mark).
73q. Litman, supra note 65, at 165 (arguing that the domain name system
should be designed in ways that make sense "from technical and Internet policy
vantage points rather than one that elevates today's marketing plans into the ration-
ale for the architecture of the Internet7).
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sions by ICANN on the structure of the domain name system will af-
fect the ways in which consumers perceive domain names and thus
how trademark rights are affected by the use of trademarks as domain
names. Most notable among these decisions is the development of
additional generic top-level domains!'4 This is not a wholly new sug-
gestion. It can be found in proposals put forward bythe International
Ad-Hoc Committee in 1998, and was recently accepted by ICANN!,
Trademark owners have in recent years vigorously opposed these at-
tempts, arguing that this was a recipe for more confusion. If Apple
Computer had failed to register apple.com, and .com. was the only ge-
neric top-level domain in which registrations were freely available,
then Apple Computer would only have to deal with one unscrupulous
defendant. However, offer the name in four domains and Apple
would have to pursue four claims; offer the name in twelve and the
costs increase proportionately. So the argument goes. Indeed, if one
assumed that Apple Computer, even after obtaining the rights in the
APPLE mark in each top-level domain, would have to monitor all
similar domain names (e.g., applepc.com), then the costs may become
quite significant.
But this argument rests on the premise that permitting use of the
mark in ary other domain name for any other type of good will im-
pinge upon the rights of the trademark owner. This need not be the
case. It will depend in large part on how the new generic top-level
domains are allocated, what generic domains are chosen, how con-
sumer use and understanding of the different domains evolves, what
limits exist on registration, and whether technological developments
change the use of domain names in social habits. Indeed, the Court of
4 This mayprovide a vehicle for the courts to get out from under the different
layers of early decision-making and reassess the proper scope of protection for
trademarks vis- -vis third party domain name registrants. Such a development
would parallel software copyright jurisprudence; courts sought initially to provide a
broad, secure environment for intellectual property owners operating in new tech-
nologies, only to scale back protection as the technology matured. QCam Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Labs., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986), 'uit Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing overprotection by
the 114&n court).
75 The International Ad-Hoc Committee was comprised of both trademark
owners and a variety of Intermet organizations. Another important aspect of its
proposal was that the group would assume responsibility for genetic top-level do-
main name registration from Network Solutions, Inc. For a discussion of the
Committee's proposals, see Liu, supra note 5, at 600-04.
76 See ICANN, PRELMINARY REPORT: MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN
YOKOHAMA, supra note 37 (approving resolution authorizing new top-level do-
mains).
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has already recognized (in the context
of existing generic top-level domains) that use of the mark as a do-
main name in one generic domain may be different from use in an-
other.'7 Similarly, if, for example, ICANN supported the establish-
ment of a domain with negative connotations (such as .sucks, or
.hur), 78 it is arguable79 that consumers would not be confused about
any association between Apple computers and apple.sucks and would
develop an understanding that .sucks addresses were affirmatively un-
connected to the owners of the mark Such a development might
give recognition to the free speech and other countervailing concerns
found in existing trademark law without imperiling trademark owners'
77 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. S umpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999)
(declining to automatically extend case law regarding the dilution caused by use of
domain name registrations in the .com. domain to registrations in the .net domain,
and concluding that "although evidence on the record ... demonstrates that the
.com and .net distinction is illusory, a factfinder could infer that dilution does not
occur with a trademarknet registration" thus precluding summary judgment for the
plaintif).
78 The Consumer Project on Technology indicated its intention to apply to
manage a new top-level domain name called sucks. See Jon Swarz, Dot-ConQ Meet
Dot-Biz: More Dormins inSight, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 2000, at B3. For an overview of
the process of applying for new top-level domains, see ICANN, NEW TLD
APPLICATION PROCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 12; see also ICANN, ThD
APPLICATIONS LODGED (Oct. 2, 2000) (listing applications to sponsor new top-level
domains, and the domains for which sponsorship-was sought), at http://www.icann.
org/tlds/tld-applications-lodged-02oct00.htm. The selection of new domains, and
of the operators of each new domain, will be made in accordance with criteria con-
sistent ;ith the ICANN Board's resolution in Yokohama. See ICANN,
PRELIMINARY REPORT: MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN YOKOHAMA, supra
note 37.
79 Although experience in the context of parody cases suggests that this might
require some revision of attitudes (or the development of a sense of humor) in some
courts. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 777-79 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding parody infringed plaintiff's trademark).
80 Whether, and to what extent, these perceptions would develop might depend
u pon whether trademark owners could or would register in the .sucks domain.
Permitting the Microsoft Corporation ownership of microsoftsucks might be as
socially inadvisable as permittn the Apple Corporation to own microsoft.com.)
Rules that incentivize (or enable mark owners to do so should be avoided, because
they would merely result in trademark owners incuring yet more wasted costs and
would stifle an avenue of criticism. Indeed, restrictions on who could own names in
the new domains, reflecting initial practices in the existing top-level domains, might
be useful in this re ard. The published criteria for new domains envisage both unre-
stricted top-level dmain names (with no enforced restrictions on who may apply
for registration within the domain or on what uses may be made of those registra-
tions) and restricted top-level domains (with restrictions of either or both kind). See
ICANN, NEW T.D APPLICATION PROCESS OVERVIEW, supra note 12.
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legitimate defenses against unfair competition."1 Thus, although de-
veloping independently, the domain name system could be crafted
with an eye to ensuring that trademark values (whether the affirmative
values of protection or the correspondingly important limits on pro-
tection) are not threatened.
If we decide that the two systems should develop in parallel,
guided by the independent policy objectives underlying each system,
then the debate will focus on what those objectives are. The trade-
mark debate is essentially one of applying, rather than constructing,
those objectives. To be sure, the recent expansions of trademark
protection can be framed in terms of a drift from a tort-based to a
property-based notion of trademarks. rn practical terms, however, the
real debate is a question of degree: what level and kinds of confusion
will we tolerate among consumers, and how remote must a threat to a
trademark's goodwill be before we permit it? The former can be de-
veloped by courts taking proper account of purchasing practices in
cyberspace. The latter is a more troubling question. Indeed, I have
argued elsewhere that it is an inquiry without any helpful internal
compass, and that any certainty of content will only come from cou-
pling the inquiry with analysis of consumer confusion." These are
classical trademark debates, not new debates inspired by cyberspace.
But if consumers are cyberactors (and they are), then the practices of
the domain name system will and must inform that debate. The do-
main name system here does not revamp the principles of trademark
law;, it simply shapes their application consistent with long-defined
public policy objectives.
In the domain name context, there needs to be candid debate
about the value of permitting speculation in property that has signifi-
cant commercial, social, and political significance. This independent
inquiry into domain name system values will inevitably be more in the
nature of an articulation of first principles than of trademark law;, this
is too new a regime to have settled on the values in as fixed a manner
81 For an interesting discussion of the circumstances that might an-ant order-
ing the transfer of ownership of domain names that use components clearly con-
noting criticism (such as harvardsucks.com), see Standard Chartered PLC v. Purge
I.T., No. D2000-0681 (WIPO Arb. and Med. Ctr. Panel Aug. 13, 2000), at http://
arbiter.-wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-0681.html. While permitting reg-
istration of such domain names by persons seeking to sell the domain name back to
the mark holder for profit (i.e., cybersquatters) might serve no useful purpose, it also
is not clear that a transfer back to the mnark owner would be the ideal response.
82 Sw Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Ratioa Liits of Tradermrk Pwao in U.S.
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY LAWAND PouCY (-ansen ed., forthcoming 2000).
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is too new a regime to have settled on the values in as fixed a manner
as trademark law. Just as the domain name system affected the inde-
pendent assessment of trademark law, so too the lessons of trademark
law might helpfully inform the construction of the domain name re-
gime, including a recognition that certain terms are too important to
be the property of a single individual.
4. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the problems facing the domain name system illus-
trates well the challenges posed in asking, "What law controls in cy-
berspace?" The question is unlikely to produce a single "law." The
rules that will control the allocation and use of domain names, a
prototypically cyberspace activity, will inevitably (and perhaps appro-
priately) reflect laws that are national, international, and supranational
in nature. They will be developed in quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
fora that are national, international, and supranational in nature. The
rules will also challenge conceptual boundaries of trademark law that
have placed the United States apart from the rest of the world. Such
prognostication might appear prosaic. And in some sense it is. But its
prosaic nature masks an exciting future, because it can scarcely be
doubted that many previously impregnable boundaries- geographic
and conceptual- will be shattered in that process.
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